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Abstract
Epistemic logic with non-standard knowledge operators, especially the “knowing-value” operator,
has recently gathered much attention. With the “knowing-value” operator, we can express knowledge
of individual variables, but not of the relations between them in general. In this paper, we propose a new
operator Kf to express knowledge of the functional dependencies between variables. The semantics
of this Kf operator uses a function domain which imposes a constraint on what counts as a functional
dependency relation. By adjusting this function domain, different interesting logics arise, and in this
paper we axiomatize three such logics in a single agent setting. Then we show how these three logics
can be unified by allowing the function domain to vary relative to different agents and possible worlds.
A multiagent axiomatization is given in this case.
1 Introduction
De re knowledge or in general non-standard knowledge in epistemic logic is attracting continuing
attention. This line of research started from the very beginning of epistemic logic: Hintikka discussed
a “knowing-who” operator in [3], and Plaza a “knowing-value” operator Kv in his seminal work
[4]. However, it is the recent effort in providing formal semantics and axiomatizations of those non-
standard knowledge operators, as outlined in the survey [8], that layed a solid foundation for further
investigation. Among all the non-standard knowledge operators axiomatized so far, the “knowing-
value”, or equivalently the “knowing-what” operator, has received most attention, partly due to its
mathematical elegance and partly because of its potential application in information security reasoning.
Recent major development of this Kv operator started with the axiomatization in [10, 9], followed by the
∗The author would like to give special thanks toMalvin Gattinger andWesley H. Holliday for their unreserved helpful comments.
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simplification of the semantics in [2] and the enrichment of the language through announcing values
and propositions in [1, 7].
Building on the above results about the “knowing-value” operator, this paper considers the
knowedge of the functional dependency between variables, which is a natural extension of the knowl-
edge of individual variables to the knowledge of relations among variables. The precise meaning of
“knowing a/the functional dependency between variables” is not easy to pin down and might be context
sensitive, as illustrated by the difficulty to choose the correct article here: it is safe to say “knowing
the value of a variable” since a variable can only take one value in the actual world (or any world), but
there might be quite a lot functions, different from each other, yet all governing the relation between
the same two variables in a set of possible worlds. We postpone further discussion to the last section,
but it should be intuitive that “functionality” is at least a minimal requirement, that is, to know any
functional dependency between variables c and d, at least for any two possible worlds where c has the
same value, d should also have the same value, however different from the value of c.
Here one natural choice is to make functionality the only requirement of “knowing a/the functional
dependency between variables”, and both [7, 1] made this choice. The key intuition behind this choice
is that, what matters in the end are the values of variables. Recall how implication in Heyting algebras
for intuitionistic logic is defined: p → q is the weakest proposition such that if conjoined with p by
taking conjunction, we get something stronger than q, or in other words, we are able to infer q. In
our knowing-value context, we might also be interested and only interested in knowing the values.
Then, functional dependency of d upon c should be interpreted as the weakest proposition such that if
“conjoined” with the knowledge of the value of d, we are able to infer the value of c.
The weakest proposition possessing this bridging-the-gap property depends on how we interpret
the word “conjoin” here. If it is taken to be the propositional conjunction, then what we get is again
the propositional implication Kv(c) → Kv(d). If “conjoin” means revealing the actual value of c to
the agent, then [c]Kv(d) in [7] is an exact formalization. Model-theoretically speaking this means that
functionality between c and d holds on the set of possible worlds where the value of c is correct, and
consequently, once all possible worlds where c’s value is wrong are eliminated, the value of d becomes
fixed and hence known. If “conjoin” means to entertain the hypothesis that one of the epistemically
possible values of c obtains, then the functionality condition from c to d among all possible worlds
is the minimal requirement. This is equivalent to K[c]Kv(d), which says: I know that for all possible
values that c can take, once that is revealed to be the real value of c, the value of d will also be known.
In [1], this is exactly the semantics of Kcd.
Another famous work on dependency taking functionality as the only requirement is Dependence
Logic [6, 5]. The team semantics it uses for the dependence atom =(c, d) is exactly the functionality
condition, though the teams in a model do not originate from an epistemic setting.
The semantics to be proposed in this paper will differ from the above pure functionality approach
and will subsume it as a special case. But the key inspiration comes from the basic strategy explained
in [8]: pack an existential quantifier and a modal quantifier together in the form of ∃xφ(x). Under
this pattern, the knowledge of the functional dependency of variables c and d is expressed as: there
exists a function f in a predetermined function domain F which works, in the sense that d = f (c), in
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all epistemic scenarios. Thus, F can be seen as an agent’s prior knowledge about possible functional
dependency relations, and to know the dependency between variables is to find a possible function
that works or explains all possibilities. To put it more colloquially, to know the functional dependency
between c and d is not simply to see that functionality holds between them, but also to see that
the functional relation “make sense”. Let us use Kf (C, d) to express this knowledge of functional
dependency of d upon a finite set of variables C.
As argued above, when “knowing-dependency” serves as a tool for expressing potential “knowing-
value”, we do not need a requirement stronger than functionality. But this is not always the case.
Consider a typical scenario in information security: agent A receives an encrypted message d = enc(c)
from agent B. Ideally, A knows the value of d, say d = 0, but knows nothing about c. So the
epistemically possible worlds for A are
{c = 0, d = 0}, {c = 1, d = 0}, {c = 2, d = 0}, · · · .
Certainly the functionality from c to d holds as d has only one possible value. But agent A is apparently
ignorant about the functional relationship between variables d and c. The witness to the functionality
here is the constant function 0, which is extremely unlikely to be the encryption function enc that
B uses. So agent A would not in this case assert that she knows that the message d she receives is
derived from the message c that B intends to send through some encryption: no encryption function
she deems possible would allow all those possibilities. Thus, to claim the knowledge of the functional
dependency of d on c, we do need something more than functionality. With our operator Kf , we can
use KfA({c}, d) to express “A knows a functional dependency relation between c and d that is plausible
in the information security context”, if we let F to be the set of all functions that is plausible in this
context.
Thus, the Kf operator can be used to model scenarios where the value of variables in the realized
world (the agent’s world) is not the sole concern of the agent. It might be that our agent does not
want an inexplicable relationship between variables, or it might be that the agent requires that any
functional dependency she knows to be applicable not only to her actual world but also to worlds
metaphysically possible or worlds evolved in time, where some a priori rules preclude too strange
functional dependency relationships. In the previous case, certainly d is known to A already, but the
constant function that witnesses the functionality there is not likely to be applicable to another round
of message exchange.
In the rest of the paper, we first define the logic that incorporates knowledge K , “knowing-value”Kv
and “knowing-function”Kf operators which we call LKVF and the corresponding base axiom system
LKVF. Then we show how different domains of functions, viewed as a parameter of LKVF, induce
different sets of validities and axioms. Then all those cases will be put into a unified framework where
a multiagent logic with the same operators is axiomatized. In the last section, we will discuss further
interpretations of “knowing a/the functional dependency between variables” and possible future work.
3
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Syntax and Semantics of LKVF
Definition 1 (Syntax) Given a countably infinite set P of propositional letters and a set Q of the
names of variables, the formulas in LKVF are defined by:
φ ::= ⊤ | p | Kv(d) | Kf (C, d) | (φ ∧ φ) | ¬φ | Kφ
where p ∈ P, d ∈ Q, and C ⊆ f in Q. ⊆ f in means a finite subset, possibly empty.
Here Kv(d) is to be interpreted as “knowing the value of d”, and Kφ “knowing that φ is the case”.
Kf (C, d) says that the agent knows a functional dependency relationship from C to d. By convention,
we set ⊥, (φ∨ψ), (φ→ ψ) as ¬⊤,¬(¬φ∧¬ψ),¬(φ∧¬ψ), and omit unnecessary parentheses. We also
write Kf (c, d) as an abbreviation of Kf ({c}, d).
In order to interpret the Kf operator in LKVF, we need a predefined domain G of possible values
for variables in Q, and a set of F functions on this G. F might contain polyadic functions in GG
n
and
also zero-adic functions. Formally F ⊆
⋃∞
n=0
GG
n
. It is important to note here that in this setting,
F and G are important parameters of LKVF instead of parts of the models. In other words, they are
shared by all models in the logic.
As we are considering single agent S5, no explicit accessibility relation is needed. So formally, a
model is:
M = 〈W,U,V〉
where W is the set of possible worlds, U : W × P → {0, 1} is the assignment for propositional letters,
and V : W × Q → G is the assignment for variables. For any finite subset C of Q, we fix an order
of the elements in C and define V(w,C) = 〈V(w, d) | d ∈ C〉. When C is empty, this degenerates
into the unique empty tuple. We call this the joint assignment of variables in C, and whenever we
have a function from Q to G, if it is applied to a set C, we mean this joint assignment. Now the truth
conditions are:
Definition 2 (Semantics)
M,w  ⊤ always
M,w  p ⇔ U(w, p) = 1
M,w  Kv(d) ⇔ ∃x ∈ G, ∀w′ ∈ W,V(w′, d) = x
M,w  Kf (C, d) ⇔ ∃ f ∈ F, ∀w′ ∈ W,V(w′, d) = f (V(w′,C))
M,w  φ ∧ ψ ⇔ M,w  φ andM,w  ψ
M,w  ¬φ ⇔ notM,w  φ
M,w  Kφ ⇔ ∀w′ ∈ W,M,w′  φ
Here the Kv operator has the same meaning as that of Kv in [10]: Kv(d) means that under current
epistemic uncertainty, the value of d is certain. The new operator Kf (C, d) here means: the agent can
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find a function in the set of available functions F that can be used to explain the functional dependency
relation between C and d. While both operators have the same structure in their semantics, namely
∃, the key difference here is that, if Kv(d) is true, only one value will be the witness, yet for Kf this
is usually not the case.
To summarize, our logicLKVF extends the standard propositional epistemic logic by adding Kv(d)
and Kf (C, d) to the language, adding a valuation of the variables to the models, and introducing a new
function domain F as part of the logic. Now it has the following parameters:
• P: the set of propositional letters
• Q: the set of variable names
• G: the set of values that variables can take
• F: the set of functions that the agent deems possible a priori.
All of them will have some effect on the validities of LKVF, but P and Q will remain unchanged
throughout the whole paper, since they can be viewed as part of the language. G needs to be large for
completeness results, and we will specify how large it should be. F will change the validities in LKVF
in an interesting way. Thus, it will be one of the main focuses of this paper. Later we show how F can
also be put into the models.
2.2 Base Axiom System and Soundness Condition
As defined above, the Kf operator expresses functional dependencies among variables and thus resem-
bles the dependency relation in database theory. Using Armstrong’s three axioms in [11], we obtain
this base system LKVF:
TAUT Propositional Tautologies
K K(φ→ ψ) → (Kφ→ Kψ) KV4 Kv(d) → KKv(d)
T Kφ→ φ KV5 ¬Kv(d) → K¬Kv(d)
4 Kφ→ KKφ KF4 Kf (C, d) → KKf (C, d)
5 ¬Kφ→ K¬Kφ KF5 ¬Kf (C, d) → K¬Kf (C, d)
PROJ Kf (C, c) c ∈ C
TRAN
( ∧
d∈D
Kf (C, d)
)
∧ Kf (D, e) → Kf (C, e)
VF
(∧
c∈C
Kv(c)
)
∧ Kf (C, d) → Kv(d)
MP
φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
NEC
φ
Kφ
Here only the projectivity and transitivity axioms are used. The reason is that in our language the
syntax of Kf allows only one variable to be dependent upon a set of variables, not a set upon a set. Thus,
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the additivity property Kf (A, B) ∧ Kf (A,C) → Kf (A, B ∪ C) dealing with the second set of variables
after Kf is not used and will follow from the properties of the conjunction if we define Kf (C, D) to
be
∧
d∈D Kf (C, d). Then the augmentation axiom in the usual presentation of Armstrong’s axioms
follows from additivity, projectivity, and transitivity. To show this, suppose Kf (A, B). By projectivity,
Kf (A∪ C,C) and Kf (A∪ C, A). Together with the assumption Kf (A, B), we have Kf (A ∪ C, B). So by
additivity applied to Kf (A∪ C,C) and Kf (A ∪ C, B), Kf (A∪ C, B ∪ C).
By convention, an empty conjunction is ⊤. So when the set D in TRAN is empty, it actually says
Kf (∅, e) → Kf (C, e) for all C ⊆ Q. And when the set C in VF is empty, it says Kf (∅, d) → Kv(d).
We will discuss the axiomatizations of three different settings using a large, a small, and an
intermediate F in LKVF respectively. For them, we either use LKVF itself or add some other special
axioms. To simplify repetitive work, here we give a condition on F in LKVF for the soundness of
LKVF:
Proposition 1 When F satisfies the following, LKVF is sound with respect to LKVF:
• For every i, j ∈ N such that 0 < i ≤ j and function f : Gj → G, f (x1, x2, . . . , xj ) = xi is in F.
We denote this special projection function as idi, j .
• For every f ∈ F, if f is n-ary with n ≥ 1, then for every g1, . . . gn ∈ F, f (g1(), . . . , gn()) ∈ F.
Namely, F is closed under function composition.
Proof. Here we only prove the soundness of the three less trivial axioms:
• By the first property of F, PROJ holds. If d ∈ C, suppose d appears in C as the ith variable, then
V(w, d) = V(w,C)[i] always holds, and thus the witness of Kf (C, d) is idi, |C | .
• By the second property of F, TRAN holds. The antecedent of this axiom states the existence of f
and gis in the second property. So the composition of f and gis exists in F, which witnesses the
consequent of TRAN.
• We want to show
VF :
(∧
c∈C
Kv(c)
)
∧ Kf (C, d) → Kv(d).
Let C be enumerated as c1, . . . , cn and suppose the antecedent in VF holds. Then
∧
c∈C Kv(c) is
true. This means we have a tuple a¯ ∈ Gn such that
∀w,V(w,C) = a¯.
Further we have Kf (C, d), which means we have a f ∈ F such that
∀w,V(w, d) = f (V(w,C)) = f (a¯).
Thus, there exists an element b := f (a¯) ∈ G such that d evaluates to it in all possible worlds. 
We will briefly mention how F is going to satisfy this soundness condition in all the following cases.
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3 Full Domain of Functions
In this section, we deal with the case where F is as large as possible, namely F =
⋃
{GG
i
| i ∈ N}.
Now the Kf operator degenerates into a functionality test, as all functions are allowed:
M,w  Kf (C, d) ⇔
∀w1,w2 ∈ W,V(w1,C) = V(w2,C) ⇒ V(w1, d) = V(w2, d).
This is true because once we have the right hand side true, we will obtain a partial function f satisfying
∀w ∈ W, f (V(w,C)) = V(w, d). And it is trivial to extend this partial function into a total function.
Now, ifM,w  Kv(d), then ∀w1,w2 ∈ W,V(w1, d) = V(w2, d), so the right hand side of the above
truth condition holds, and consequently, Kf (C, d) is true in M,w. This justifies the soundness of our
new axiom in this case:
EXT : Kv(d) → Kf (C, d)
where C ⊆ f in Q, possibly empty. We name this axiom EXT because it means that in this case every
function on G, regardless of its meaning, can serve as a witness of the truth condition of Kf . Further,
F satisfies the condition given in Proposition 1, so LKVF + EXT is sound. In the following, we prove
that if G is sufficiently large, then LKVF + EXT is in fact complete as well.
Given an arbitrary set A of formulas consistent in LKVF + EXT, the Lindenbaum lemma enables
us to construct a maximal consistent set Γ such that A ⊆ Γ. Now to build a model for Γ, we need
to accompany this Γ by other maximal consistent sets (possible worlds). For example, if we have
¬Kf (C, d) in Γ, then we need two possible worlds on which the values of C coincide while the values
of d on them diverge.
To this end, we first define some useful sets. Given any maximal consistent set Γ, define
KΓ = {φ | Kφ ∈ Γ},KvΓ = {d | Kv(d) ∈ Γ}.
They collect all the propositional and the value knowledge respectively in Γ. For any C ⊆ Q, we say
C is closed under Kf in Γ if for all Cf ⊆ f in C and d ∈ Q such that Kf (Cf , d) ∈ Γ, we have d ∈ C as
well. Using axioms TRAN and PROJ, it is not hard to see that for all C ⊆ f in Q,
C+Γ := {d | Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ}
is closed under Kf in Γ and C ⊆ C+Γ. This can be seen as the dependency hull of the finite set C.
An important observation is that, by axiom VF, if Kf (∅, d) ∈ Γ, then Kv(d) ∈ Γ, so ∅+Γ ⊆ KvΓ. Also,
by axiom EXT, if Kv(d) ∈ Γ then Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ for all C ⊆ Q. So KvΓ ⊆ C
+Γ for all C ⊆ f in Q, and
in particular KvΓ ⊆ ∅
+Γ . So KvΓ = ∅
+Γ . This motivates us to define the set of all finitely generated
closed sets:
MΓ = {C
+Γ | C ⊆ f in Q}.
Clearly MΓ is non-empty, and KvΓ ∈ MΓ. Also, for all X ∈ M we have KvΓ ⊆ X , so in other words,
any finitely generated closed set contains all variables with known value. Then, we have the following
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disjoint decomposition of Q using X ∈ MΓ :
Q = KvΓ ∪ (X\KvΓ) ∪ (Q\X).
Intuitively, the values of the variables in KvΓ must hold fixed among all possible worlds; the values of
the variables in X\KvΓ must vary relative to those in KvΓ in a uniform way to respect the functional
dependencies among them; and the values of the variables in Q\X must vary even when all values in
X\KvΓ are fixed, since they are not determined by X .
For example, suppose Q = {a, b, c, d}, G = N, and we want to model Γ whose knowledge consists
only of:
Kv(a),Kf (b, c)
and their logical consequences such as Kf (c, a). Then, when considering X = {a, b, c} = {b}+Γ, we
have KvΓ = {a}, X\KvΓ = {b, c}, and Q\X = {d}. Among all possible worlds, the value of a must be
fixed; c must change as c < KvΓ, but it should change together with b in case of violating functionality;
and d has to change even when b together with c are fixed to refute Kf (b, d). Thus, one instantiation
of this could be:
KvΓ a = 0 a = 0 a = 0
X\KvΓ b = 0 b = 1 b = 1
c = 0 c = 1 c = 1
Q\X d = 0 d = 1 d = 2
where the columns are possible assignments. For every X ∈ MΓ which collects all closed set of
variables, we need such possibilities to take care of all formulas of the form ¬Kf (C, d) in Γ, because
there will be one X , namely C+Γ, that separates C and d. Then, the value of d can vary even when
those of C are fixed.
The reason we are using only finitely generated closed subsets ofQ is that, when |Q| is infinite, the
cardinality remains the same. Formally, define Pf (Q) to be the collection of all finite subsets of Q,
then |Pf (Q)| = |Q| when |Q| ≥ ℵ0. Of course, when Q is finite, Pf coincides with P, the ordinary
powerset construction. Then, by the definition of MΓ , |MΓ | ≤ |Pf (Q)|.
Now suppose |G| ≥ |Pf (Q) × {0, 1}|, which is the largeness condition forG in this case, then there
exists an injection g : MΓ × {0, 1} → G. Using this g we can define a function Vp on MΓ × {0, 1} ×Q
as follows:
Vp(〈X, i〉, d) =

g(∅, 0) d ∈ KvΓ
g(X, 0) d ∈ X\KvΓ
g(X, i) d ∈ Q\X .
Notice how this satisfies the informal requirement, illustrated by the example above, over the values
the variables in different regions should take. When d ∈ KvΓ, its value is fixed to g(∅, 0). When
d ∈ X\KvΓ, its value depends on X as a whole but nothing else, so all variables in X\KvΓ change
uniformly from what they are assigned by g(∅, ·). When d ∈ Q\X , its value further depends on i, so
will change even when the values of the variables in X are fixed.
Formally, this definition allows us to show:
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Proposition 2 For all C ⊆ f in Q, d ∈ Q:
1. If Kv(d) ∈ Γ then
∃x ∈ G,∀〈X, i〉 ∈ M × {0, 1},Vp(〈X, i〉, d) = x;
2. If Kv(d) < Γ then
∃〈X, i〉, 〈X ′, i′〉 ∈ M × {0, 1},Vp(〈X, i〉, d) , Vp(〈X
′, i′〉, d);
3. If Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ then
∀〈X, i〉, 〈X ′, i′〉 ∈ M × {0, 1},
Vp(〈X, i〉,C) = Vp(〈X
′, i′〉,C) ⇒ Vp(〈X, i〉, d) = Vp(〈X
′, i′〉, d);
4. If Kf (C, d) < Γ then
∃〈X, i〉, 〈X ′, i′〉 ∈ M × {0, 1},
Vp(〈X, i〉,C) = Vp(〈X
′, i′〉,C) and Vp(〈X, i〉, d) , Vp(〈X
′, i′〉, d).
Proof. For the first part, the witness is x = g(∅, 0) and can be verified easily. For the second part,
as we observed before, KvΓ = ∅
+Γ ∈ MΓ. Then, if d < KvΓ, on 〈KvΓ, 0〉 and 〈KvΓ, 1〉 our valuation
function Vp gives different values by the injectivity of g.
For the third part, two cases are possible. If C ⊆ KvΓ, then d ∈ KvΓ by VF. Then Vp assigns g(∅, 0)
to d on all 〈X, i〉, making the consequent of the implication to be proven true throughout.
Now suppose C * KvΓ and take c ∈ C\(KvΓ) and 〈X, i〉, 〈X
′, i′〉 ∈ M × {0, 1} such that
Vp(〈X, i〉,C) = Vp(〈X
′, i′〉,C). We first show X = X ′ by focusing on this c < KvΓ. Since c < KvΓ, by
the definition of Vp , there exists j, k ∈ {0, 1} such that
Vp(〈X, i〉, c) = g(X, j),Vp(〈X
′, i′〉, c) = g(X ′, k).
By the injectivity of g, they are equal only if at least X = X ′. Based on this, if i = i′ then 〈X, i〉 = 〈X ′, i′〉
and trivially d receives the same value from Vp .
If i , i′, recall that we assumed Vp(〈X, i〉,C) = Vp(〈X, i
′〉,C). For all c ∈ C, it follows that c ∈ X
as otherwise the values Vp gives to c differ on i and i
′. Hence C ⊆ X and by assumption X ∈ MΓ ,
which means X is closed. Thus, as Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, d ∈ X as well. By definition,
Vp(〈X, i〉, d) = g(X, 0) = g(X
′, 0) = Vp(〈X
′, i′〉, d).
For the last part, we assume that Kf (C, d) < Γ. Then d < C+Γ. By the injectivity of g and the fact
that C ⊆ C+Γ,
Vp(〈C
+Γ, 0〉, d) , Vp(〈C
+Γ, 1〉, d),
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whereas
Vp(〈C
+Γ, 0〉,C) = Vp(〈C
+Γ, 1〉,C).
The above proposition handles the knowledge and ignorance about values and functional dependencies.
Now we need to combine it with a traditional completeness proof for epistemic S5 logic. Denote
L := {∆ | ∆ is maximal consistent in LKVF + EXT and KΓ ⊆ ∆}.
Here L is non-empty since by axiom T, KΓ ⊆ Γ so at least Γ ∈ L. Then we define a model on possible
worlds W = L × MΓ × {0, 1}: M = 〈W,U,V〉 where for every 〈∆,C, i〉 ∈ W :
U(〈∆,C, i〉, p) = [p ∈ ∆]
V(〈∆,C, i〉, d) = Vp(〈C, i〉, d)
where [p ∈ ∆] is the indicator function of the statement p ∈ ∆, which evaluates to 1 if the statement is
true and 0 otherwise. Here each possible world has three components: amaximally consistent set which
contains all formulas true at the world (truth lemma), a closed set of variablesC which is responsible for
instantiating the ignorance of the values of variables in C under the functional dependency constraint,
and a number 0 or 1 which is responsible for instantiating the ignorance of the functionality property
between variables in C and variables outside C.
Now the goal is to show a truth lemma, i.e., for all 〈∆,C, i〉 ∈ W, φ ∈ ∆⇔M, 〈∆,C, i〉  φ. To this
end, we first need the following simple observation.
Proposition 3 For all ∆ ∈ L,
• Kv(d) ∈ ∆⇔ Kv(d) ∈ Γ
• Kf (C, d) ∈ ∆⇔ Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ
• Kφ ∈ ∆⇔ Kφ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Simply use the axioms 4, 5. For example, the third property follows from
Kφ ∈ Γ ⇒ KKφ ∈ Γ [axiom 4]
⇒ Kφ ∈ KΓ [definiton of KΓ]
⇒ Kφ ∈ ∆ [KΓ ⊆ ∆]
Kφ < Γ ⇒ ¬Kφ ∈ Γ [Γ is maximally consistent]
⇒ K¬Kφ ∈ Γ [axiom 5]
⇒ ¬Kφ ∈ KΓ [KΓ definition]
⇒ ¬Kφ ∈ ∆ [KΓ ⊆ ∆]
⇒ Kφ < ∆ [∆ is maximally consistent].
Proposition 4 If Kφ < Γ, then there exists ∆ ∈ L such that ¬φ ∈ ∆.
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Proof. A standard exercise using necessitation and axiom K. 
Now we can prove the truth lemma:
Lemma 1 For all 〈∆,C, i〉 ∈ W, φ ∈ LKVF, φ ∈ ∆⇔M, 〈∆,C, i〉  φ.
Proof. By induction on φ, with the following possibilities:
• φ is a propositional letter or a boolean combination. This is standard.
• φ = Kv(d). Since ∆ ∈ L, by Proposition 3, Kv(d) ∈ ∆ ⇔ Kv(d) ∈ Γ. By Proposition 2, if
Kv(d) ∈ Γ then
V(〈Θ, D, j〉, d) = Vp(〈D, j〉, d) = Vp(〈D
′, j ′〉, d) = V(〈Θ′, D′, j ′〉, d)
for all 〈Θ, D, j〉, 〈Θ′,D′, j ′〉 ∈ W . IfKv(d) < Γ, byProposition2 again, there exists 〈D, j〉, 〈D′, j ′〉 ∈
M × {0, 1} such that
V(〈Γ,D, j〉, d) = Vp(〈D, j〉, d) , Vp(〈D
′, j ′〉, d) = V(〈Γ,D′, j ′〉, d).
As such,
Kv(d) ∈ ∆⇔ Kv(d) ∈ Γ ⇔M, 〈∆,C, i〉  φ.
• φ = Kf (D, d). Similar to the last one. By Proposition 3, Kf (D, d) ∈ ∆ ⇔ Kf (D, d) ∈ Γ. By
Proposition 2, Kf (D, d) ∈ Γ ⇔M, 〈∆,C, i〉  Kf (D, d).
• φ = Kψ. By Proposition 3, Kψ ∈ ∆ ⇔ Kψ ∈ Γ. If Kψ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ KΓ, so for all
〈Θ,D, j〉 ∈ W , as Θ ∈ L, ψ ∈ Θ. By the induction hypothesis, M, 〈Θ,D, j〉  ψ. Thus,
M, 〈∆,C, i〉  Kψ.
On the other hand, if Kψ < Γ, by Proposition 4, there exists Θ ∈ M such that ¬φ ∈ Θ. By
the induction hypothesis, M, 〈Θ, ∅, 0〉  ¬ψ. So M, 〈∆,C, i〉 2 Kψ. To sum up, Kψ ∈ Γ ⇔
M, 〈∆,C, i〉  Kψ. 
From this proposition, we know that for all φ ∈ Γ,M, 〈Γ, ∅, 0〉  φ. As the consistent set A we chose
at the very beginning is contained in Γ,M, 〈Γ, ∅, 0〉  A, which brings us:
Theorem 1 Given |G| ≥ |Pf (Q)×{0, 1}| and F =
⋃
{GG
i
| i ∈ N}, LKVF+EXT axiomatizesLKVF.
4 Minimal Function Domain
In Proposition 1 we proved the soundness condition for LKVF. Notice that the minimal function
domain that satisfies this soundness condition is
F = {idi, j | i, j ∈ N, 0 < i ≤ j}.
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In this section, we consider the axiomatization of the validities of LKVFwith this F. Here, two axioms
besides our base system LKVF are valid:
CHOO Kf (C, d) →
∨
c∈C Kf (c, d),
EQU Kf (c, d) → Kf (d, c).
The validity of the first axiom is justified by:
d = idi, j (c1, c2, . . . , cj ) = ci = id1,1(ci),
and notice that when C = ∅, it degenerates to Kf (∅, d) → ⊥ or equivalently ¬Kf (∅, d), which is true
because no zero-ary function exists in F. This also means that EXT is unsound in this case, because
even if Kv(d) is true, Kf (∅, d) is false regardless. So Kv(d) → Kf (C, d) is in general false.
The validity of the second axiom follows from
d = id1,1(c) = c ⇒ c = d = id1,1(d).
Thus, LKVF + CHOO + EQU is sound. Given these two axioms and the fact that F consists only of
projection functions, Kf (c, d) is actually talking about the equality of c, d over all possible worlds, even
though the value might not be known. This motivates the construction of the equivalence relation by
Kf (c, d) used below.
Now we turn to the proof of the completeness of LKVF + CHOO + EQU. Again, given a consistent
set A, our plan is that we first extend it to a maximal consistent set Γ, then deal with its de re knowledge
and propositional knowledge separately, and finally take their Cartesian product to obtain a model of
Γ.
First, we partition Q into equivalence classes with equivalence relation ∼ defined by
c ∼ d ⇔ Kf (c, d) ∈ Γ.
Its reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity follow from the axioms PROJ, EQU, and TRAN. Indeed, if we
use the C+Γ and MΓ construction, MΓ will contain precisely those partitions and their unions. Every
maximally consistent set, or a “world”, naturally gives rise to such an equivalence relation on Q.
For every c ∈ Q, define [c] = {d | c ∼ d}, and for every C ⊆ Q, define [C] = 〈[c] | c ∈ C〉,
the collection of the equivalence classes which contain at least one of its elements. In particular,
[KvΓ] = 〈[c] | Kv(c) ∈ Γ〉.
Now, if |G| ≥ |Q| ≥ |[Q]|, then there will be two injections from [Q] to G, u and v, such that
u([c]) = v([c]) ⇔ [c] ∈ [KvΓ].
For example, we can let u be any injection and then make a rotation over the function values of u on
[Q]\[KvΓ] to obtain v in case of Q being finite, or let v(d) be the successor of u(d) for d ∈ [Q]\[KvΓ]
in case of Q being infinite (assuming it can be well ordered). We do not need to seek more valuations
of variables to prove the truth lemma in this case or to instantiate the ignorances of the knowledge
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about values in Γ. Any one of them is capable of refuting Kf (C, d) < Γ and together they instantiate
Kv(d) < Γ.
Defining Vp as a function from {u, v} × Q to G by Vp(t, d) = t([d]), the following proposition is
true:
Proposition 5 For any d ∈ Q,C ⊆ f in Q:
1. if Kv(d) ∈ Γ, ∃x ∈ G,∀t ∈ {u, v},Vp(t, d) = x
2. if Kv(d) < Γ, ∃t, t′ ∈ {u, v},Vp(t, d) , Vp(t
′, d)
3. if Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, ∃ f ∈ F,∀t ∈ {u, v}, f (Vp(t,C)) = Vp(t, d)
4. if Kf (C, d) < Γ, ∀ f ∈ F,∃t ∈ {u, v}, f (Vp(t,C)) , Vp(t, d).
Proof. The first two parts are immediate from the definition of u, v: Kv(d) ∈ Γ ⇔ [d] ∈ [KvΓ] ⇔
u([d]) = v([d]) ⇔ Vp(u, d) = Vp(v, d).
For the third property, suppose Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ and enumerate C by c1, . . . , cj . By axiom CHOO
and the maximality of Γ, there exists i such that Kf (ci, d) ∈ Γ and thus [d] = [ci]. Now, for every
t ∈ {u, v},Vp(t,C) = 〈[c1], [c2], . . . , [cj ]〉, so [d] = idi, j (Vp(t,C)) and we see that the functional
relation between C, d is idi, j .
For the last one, suppose Kf (C, d) < Γ. It follows that [d] < [C] because otherwise, [d] ∈ [C] and
there exists c ∈ C, [d] = [c], hence Kf (c, d) ∈ Γ. By axiom PROJ, Kf (C, c) ∈ Γ, and then by axiom
TRAN, Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, which contradicts the assumption. Again enumerate C = 〈c1, . . . , cj 〉. Since u
is injective and [d] < [C], for all ci ∈ C, u([d]) , u([ci]). Thus, for every j-ary function idi, j ∈ F,
idi, j (Vp(u,C)) = u([ci]) , u([d]). Actually we can use v here as well. The reason we need both of
them is that we need to instantiate ¬Kv(d) for d < KvΓ. 
To build a model for Γ, define
L = {∆ | ∆ is a maximal consistent set ,KΓ ⊆ ∆}
W = L × {u, v}
U(〈X, t〉, p) = [p ∈ X]
V(〈X, t〉, d) = Vp(t, d)
M = 〈W,U,V〉.
Then we have the following truth lemma:
Lemma 2 For all 〈Γ, t〉 ∈ W , 〈Γ, t〉  φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The difference is that we need to use Proposition 5
instead of Proposition 2. 
The completeness of LKVF + CHOO + EQU follows, so we conclude:
Theorem 2 Given |G| ≥ |Q|,F = 〈idi, j | i, j ∈ N, 0 < i ≤ j〉, LKVF+ axiomatizes LKVF.
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5 Intermediate Function Domain
In the previous two sections, we considered the minimal and the maximal function domains subject
to our soundness condition. As we can see, in both cases the axiomatizations require some axioms
besides the base system LKVF. And those axioms are not very intuitive if we intend to interpret Kf
as “knowing a/the functional dependency”. In this section, we show that we can construct a function
domain such that ifF is set to it,LKVFwill be complete and no extra axiom is needed. The construction
is somewhat artificial but in the next section, we can view this as just one step of a completeness proof
at a higher level.
The main difficulty here is to refute the axiom scheme EXT used in the axiomatization of the full
function domain case. EXT is validated in that case because whenever the value of a variable is known,
a constant function can be used to explain the functional dependency between it and any other variables
in all epistemic possibilities. Thus, to refute this scheme as an axiom, we must make sure that the
function domain encodes information more than just functionality so that we can refute Kf (c, d) even
when functionality holds, such as when Kv(d) is true. The function domain to be constructed below
will enable a suitably constructed model to refute Kf (C, d) without ever looking into the functionality
condition.
To do this, we go to higher dimensions by assuming G = 2Pf (Q), interpreted as functions from
the finite subsets of Q to {0, 1} or as a rather long sequence indexed by Pf (Q) where at each index
(dimension) C we can choose from {0, 1}. This is actually only a size requirement, since so long as
|G| ≥ |2Pf (Q) |, we can always embed 2Pf (Q) intoG by an injection. For any x ∈ G and C ⊆ f in Q, we
use x[C] to retrieve the image of C under x, which will be 0 or 1. Now we construct the intermediate
F:
Definition 3 Let F be the collection of the functions f satisfying the following constraints: where y
is f (x1, . . . xn), for all C ⊆ f in Q,
x1[C] = x2[C] = . . . = xn[C] = 0 ⇒ y[C] = 0.
Alternatively, where
Lmaxn = { f ∈ G
Gn | ∀C ⊆ f in Q, f (x1, . . . xn)[C] ≤ max(x1[C], . . . xn[C])},
with max() = 0, define F =
⋃
i∈N Lmaxi .
Notice that the requirement is specified for all dimensions individually, and they do not interfere
with each other. This allows us to do constructions and proofs for each dimension separately.
Nowwe can check that thisF satisfies the soundness condition. Projection functions are all included
in F because they all satisfy the above constraint: for any C ⊆ f in Q, either xi[C] = y[C] = 1, where
the antecedent and the consequent are both false, or xi[C] = y[C] = 0, where they are both true.
For compositionality, let h = f (g1, . . . gn). If all inputs to h are 0 at any dimension C, then since
g1, . . . gn ∈ F, they evaluate to 0 at dimension C. Then all inputs to f are 0 at this dimension C. So as
f ∈ F, it evaluates to 0 as well. Thus, h is in F.
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To prove the completeness of LKVF with respect to LKVF with this new function domain F, again
the satisfiability of any maximal consistent set Γ is required, and the crucial step is still the construction
of a set of valuations such that the formulas of the form Kv(d),¬Kv(d),Kf (C, d), and ¬Kf (C, d) in Γ
are satisfied. Indeed, for this purpose, we only need two valuations, a situation similar to that in the
case of the minimal function domain. This is because when ¬Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, we are refuting Kf (C, d)
not by a failure of functionality but by a failure of conformation to F. Breaking functionality requires
at least two possible value assignments, but if F says no, a single possibility is too many. Recall the
C+Γ we used in the previous two cases, which is defined as {d ∈ Q | Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ}. Now we need to
define a slightly different MΓ:
{C+Γ |C ⊆ f in Q} ∪ {KvΓ}.
This is the collection of all finitely generated closed sets plus KvΓ. We need this extra union since
axiom EXT is not available now, which means KvΓ is not automatically contained in any C
+Γ, and it is
quite possible that KvΓ is not finitely generated. But still, MΓ has a cardinality no larger than Pf (Q),
since if Q is finite, Pf (Q) contains all subsets of Q, and if infinite, Pf (Q) is also infinite and adding
one more element into it does not increase its cardinality. Thus, there is still a surjection g from Pf (Q)
to MΓ . We can think of this g as a pseudo (·)
+Γ function, and it does not matter which surjection we
use for g. Now we can specify the two valuations we need:
Definition 4 Let g be any surjection from Pf (Q) to MΓ. Define V0,V1 : Pf (Q) → G such that for
all d ∈ Q,C ⊆ f in Q,
V0(d)[C] =
{
0 if d ∈ g(C)
1 if d < g(C),
V1(d)[C] =
{
V0(d)[C] if g(C) , KvΓ
0 if g(C) = KvΓ.
The use of V0 is to refute Kf (C, d) if ¬Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, and the use of V1 is to refute Kv if ¬Kv(d) ∈ Γ.
Now we prove this in detail:
Proposition 6 If Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, then there exists f ∈ F such that for i ∈ {0, 1}, f (Vi(C)) = vi(d). If
¬Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, then for all f ∈ F, f (V0(C)) , V0(d).
Proof. To prove the first claim, assume Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ with C enumerated by c1, . . . cn. We will
construct a function f ∈ F that works in both V0 and V1: for all D ⊆ f in Q, V0(d)[D] = f (V0(C))[D]
and V1(d)[D] = f (V1(C))[D]. Obviously this construction should be done dimension by dimension.
For any D ⊆ f in Q, the possibilities are:
• d ∈ g(D). Thus, by definition, V0(d)[D] = 0. V1(d)[D] = 0 as well since the only change
happens when D = KvΓ, and even in that case, only 1 turns to 0 and not vice versa. So we
can define f (x1, . . . xn)[D] = 0. Then V0(d)[D] = f (V0(C))[D] and V1(d)[D] = f (V1(C))[D],
regardless of what V0(C) and V1(C) are.
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• d < g(D). Since g(D) is closed and Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ, C * g(D). Find cp < g(D). Define
f (x1, . . . xn)[D] = xp[D]. This definition satisfies the requirement of F. And it works for V0
because v0(d)[D] = V0(cp)[D] = 1 (both d, cp are outside g(D)). It also works for V1 because
their values change to 0 together if g(D) = KvΓ.
To prove the second claim, recall thatC+Γ = {d | Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ} is closed under Kf in Γ and contains
C by axioms TRAN and PROJ. Now since Kf (C, d) < Γ, d < C+Γ . As g is a surjection from Pf (Q)
to MΓ, there exists D ⊆ f in Q such that g(D) = C
+Γ. Thus, by the definition of V0, V0(d)[D] = 1,
while for all c ∈ C ⊆ C+Γ = g(D), V0(c)[D] = 0. Hence V0(d)[D] > max(V0(C)[D]), which makes it
impossible to find a function f ∈ F such that f (V0(C)) = V0(d). 
Proposition 7 If Kv(d) ∈ Γ, then V0(d) = V1(d). If Kv(d) < Γ, then V0(d) , V1(d).
Proof. If Kv(d) ∈ Γ, then d ∈ KvΓ. Now for any C ⊆ f in Q, if g(C) , KvΓ, then V1(d)[C] = V0(d)[C]
by definition. If g(C) = KvΓ, V1(d)[C] = 0, but V0(d)[C] = 0 as well since d ∈ KvΓ. Thus,
V0(d) = V1(d).
If Kv(d) < Γ, d < KvΓ. Since we explicitly added KvΓ to Γ, KvΓ ∈ MΓ , and we can find a C ⊆ f in Q
such that g(C) = KvΓ. Then, using the definition ofV0 andV1, we knowV0(d)[C] = 1 butV1(d)[C] = 0,
because g(C) = KvΓ and we assumed d < KvΓ. Thus, V1(d) , V0(d). 
Based on the previous two propositions, we can build a model for Γ by defining
L = {∆ | ∆ is a maximal consistent set,KΓ ⊆ ∆}
W = L × {0, 1}
U(〈X, t〉, p) = [p ∈ X]
V(〈X, t〉, d) = Vt (d)
M = 〈W,U,V〉.
With a proof which is essentially the same as the proof of the truth lemma Lemma 1 in the full function
domain case, using Propositions 6 and 7 instead of Proposition 2, we have:
Lemma 3 For all 〈Γ, t〉 ∈ W ,M, 〈Γ, t〉  φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ.
M, 〈Γ, 0〉  Γ follows from this truth lemma. This finishes the completeness proof of the intermediate
case, so we have:
Theorem 3 Given |G| ≥ |2Pf (Q) |, F =
⋃
i∈N Lmaxi , LKVF axiomatizes LKVF.
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Table 1: Choice of the function domain in LKVF and corresponding axiomatization
Full Minimal Intermediate
F =
⋃
i∈NG
Gi {idi, j | i, j ∈ N, 0 < i ≤ j}
⋃
i∈N Lmaxi
|G| ≥ |Pf (Q) × {0, 1}| |Q| |2
Pf (Q) |
Axiomatization LKVF + EXT LKVF + CHOO + EQU LKVF
6 Unifying Logic
In all the previous settings, our logic LKVF takes a function domain F as a parameter. This function
domain is meant to be the set of a priori possible functions for functional dependencies over variables.
But if this set of a priori possibilities is relative to the agents in discussion, then this set of functions
should be variable over models instead of being part of the logic and fixed for all models. After all, an
agent might hold different prior knowledge in different worlds. Also, the function domain constructed
in the intermediate case is, while not nonsensical for its interesting ≤ max structure, still somewhat
artificial for its large dimension. If this function domain is part of the model, it is at the choice of the
agent under discussion.
Indeed, if we put the function domain inside the definition of a model by setting
M = 〈F,W,U,V〉,
where F : G→ G satisfies the soundness condition that it contains all projection functions and is closed
under function composition, W is a set of possible worlds,U is an assignment function for propositional
letters, and V is an assignment function for variables, and we leave the semantics untouched, then the
soundness and completeness of LKVF follow immediately from the results presented so far. Using
LKVF∗ to denote the logic induced by the definition of the models above, we have:
Theorem 4 LKVF is sound and complete with respect to LKVF∗ when |G| ≥ |2Pf (Q) |.
Proof. Because for every model of LKVF∗, its function domain satisfies the soundness condition
Proposition 1, LKVF is sound in all the models of LKVF∗. This shows the soundness.
For any set Γ maximally consistent with respect to LKVF, take the F and the modelM constructed
in the intermediate function domain case. Then 〈F,M〉  Γ and 〈F,M〉 is a model of LKVF∗. Thus,
every maximal consistent set is satisfiable. 
The proof above is a direct adaptation of the completeness result in the intermediate function domain
case. In that case, we built a function domain that works for all maximal consistent sets in the sense
that for all maximal consistent sets Γ, this same function domain can be used to refute Kf (C, d) < Γ
when functionality cannot be used. This is actually the reason why the cardinality requirement for G
is very high there. However, in the current setting where function domains are part of the models, the
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only thing needed is a method to build a function domain for each maximal consistent set Γ so that the
functional dependency relation between C, d is rejected if ¬Kf (C, d) ∈ Γ. The difference will be made
more clear in the following multiagent case.
6.1 Multiagent logic with variable function domain
Given an index set A of agents, to accommodate multiple agents, the language is now expanded to
φ ::= ⊤ | p | Kvi(d) | Kfi(C, d) | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kiφ,
with p ∈ P, i ∈ A, d ∈ G, and C ⊆ f in G. The only difference from the single agent language defined
in Definition 1 is that now we have for each agent i a separate Kvi , Kfi , and Ki .
For semantics, a model is now defined as:
M = 〈W, 〈∼i〉i∈A,U,V, 〈Fi〉i∈A〉
where Fi is intended to assign a collection of functional relationships that agent i deems possible a
priori to all possible worlds inW . Thus, for all w ∈ W, i ∈ A, Fi(w) is required to include all projection
functions and to be closed under function composition. ∼i is the epistemic accessibility relation of
agent i and is required to be an equivalence relation onW , the set of possible worlds (complete epistemic
scenarios). Now since Fi is supposed to be “prior knowledge”, it is also required that if w ∼i w
′, then
Fi(w) = Fi(w
′). However, we are not assuming that the prior knowledge of any agent is public to other
agents, so it is quite possible that Fj (w) , Fj (w
′) if j , i, even when w ∼i w
′. In a nutshell, Fis are
not common knowledge.
The semantic clauses are defined similarly with agent indices for knowledge sentences:
M,w  Kvi(d) ⇔ ∃x ∈ G,∀w
′ ∼i w,V(w
′, d) = x
M,w  Kf (C, d) ⇔ ∃ f ∈ Fi(w), ∀w
′ ∼i w
′,V(w′, d) = f [V(w′,C)]
M,w  Kφ ⇔ ∀w′ ∼i w
′ ⇒M,w′  φ.
Let LKVF∗m name this multiagent logic. Also, let LKVFm denote the axiom system adapted from
LKVFwith indexedversionof those axioms involving knowledge operators. In particular, no interaction
between agents is allowed, as there are no axioms saying that we can derive any knowledge about other
agents from any agent. We will see that this is precisely because we allow each agent to possess its own
prior knowledge about possible functional dependencies, not necessarily known to other agents. Once
we assume that Fis are common knowledge, interactions will arise, and we will discuss this point in
the last section.
The soundness of LKVFm with respect to LKVF
∗
m follows from an indexed version of Proposition
1. For completeness we need a new construction:
Definition 5 (Dependency lattice) Given a maximal consistent set Γ in LKVFm and an agent index
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i, first define the indexed version of the (·)+Γ operator, ClΓ
i
, on finite subsets of Q as
ClΓi (C) = {d | Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ}.
Then, extend this operator to P(Q) by ClΓ
i
(C) :=
⋃
{ClΓ
i
(Cf ) | Cf ⊆ f in C}. When the context is clear,
we may drop the superscript or subscript of ClΓ
i
. Now this is a finitary closure operator as it satisfies,
through the axioms of LKVFm,
Cl(C) = Cl(Cl(C)),C ⊆ Cl(C),C ⊆ D ⇒ Cl(C) ⊆ Cl(D).
When a set C ⊆ Q satisfies C = Cl(C), it is called a closed set. A classical result is that the collection
of all closed sets under a closure operator forms a lattice 〈L,∧,∨〉 with
L = {C ⊆ Q | C = ClΓi (C)}
C ∧ D = C ∩ D
C ∨ D = ClΓi (C ∪ D),
which we name LΓ
i
. For all c ∈ Q, let ClΓ
i
(c) stands for ClΓ
i
({c}) to save a few brackets.
Also, given Γ, the indexed version of the propositional knowledge and the value knowledge of agent
i is denoted by
Ki,Γ = {φ | Kiφ ∈ Γ},Kvi,Γ = {d | Kvi(d) ∈ Γ}.
Then, it is not hard to see that LΓ
i
is only dependent on Ki,Γ , i.e., if Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ then L
Γ
i
= LΓ
′
i
. This is
because the closure operator ClΓ
i
uses only the formulas of the form Kfi(C, d) in Γ, and if we assume
Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ ,
Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ ⇔ KiKfi(C, d) ∈ Γ ⇔ KiKfi(C, d) ∈ Γ
′ ⇔ Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ
′
for all C ⊆ f in Q and d ∈ Q.
For the completeness proof to go through, there is again a cardinality requirement for G: |G| ≥
|Q × {0, 1}|, and without loss of generality, we identify G with Q × {0, 1}. The Q part will be used
to construct the function domains and refute Kf (C, d), while the {0, 1} part will be used for refuting
Kv(d).
To use the Q part to construct the function domains, we need to forget the {0, 1} part. Define
function hΓ
i
: Q × {0, 1} → LΓ
i
, 〈c, n〉 7→ ClΓ
i
(c) for each i, Γ. This map is forgetful about the second
coordinate and turns a variable name into its closure. Again the superscript and subscript are dropped
when no confusion arises. Now we are able to define a new version of the Lmax function set:
Definition 6 Given a maximal consistent set Γ and an agent index i, we can construct the dependency
lattice L and the corresponding h. Then define Fi (Γ) to be the collection of all functions f on G with
any arity n ∈ N such that:
h( f (x1, x2, . . . xn)) ≤
∨
{h(x1), h(x2), . . . h(xn)},
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where ≤ is defined in L by a ≤ b ⇔ a ∧ b = b, or equivalently, a ⊆ b. The empty disjunction is the
bottom element of L: Cl(∅).
It is straightforward to see that Fi (Γ) is dependent only on Ki,Γ. Then we need to verify the
soundness conditions immediately:
Proposition 8 For every maximal consistent set Γ and i ∈ A, Fi (Γ) contains all projection functions
on G and is closed under composition.
Proof. Take a projection function f (x1, . . . xn) = xk . Then by the definition of join in a lattice,
h(xk ) ≤
∨
{h(x1), · · · , h(xn)}
since h(xk ) ∈ {h(x1), · · · , h(xn)}.
For function composition, let x represent a sequence of variables and h(x) the sequence after the
application of h. Then take a function f (x) = g0(g1(x1), · · · gn(xn)) where x includes the union of all
xks and all g functions are already in Fi (Γ). Now
h( f (x)) = h(g0(g1(x1), · · · gn(xn)))
≤
∨
{h(g1(x1), · · · gn(xn))}
≤
∨
{∨h(x1), · · · ∨ h(xn)}
≤
∨
h(x).
This shows that the composition f satisfies the requirement and is in Fi (Γ). 
The next proposition shows why we use the dependence lattice to define the function domains
for each agent. The proposition says that to make Kfi(C, d) true, we only need to make sure that
functionality holds, and to make Kfi(C, d) false, we do not need to pay any special attention as the
function domain Fi (Γ) has already taken care of everything.
Proposition 9 For every σ ∈ 2Q, define vσ : Q → G, d 7→ 〈d, σ(d)〉. This means we restrict the
value of d ∈ Q to be 〈d, 0〉 or 〈d, 1〉. Now for every maximal consistent set Γ, i ∈ A, C ⊆ f in Q, d ∈ Q,
and Σ ⊆ 2Q:
• if Σ satisfies the functionality condition for C, d, namely for all σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ, σ1(C) = σ2(C)
implies σ1(d) = σ2(d), and if Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ, then there exists f ∈ Fi (Γ) such that for all σ ∈ Σ,
vσ(d) = f (vσ(C));
• if Kfi(C, d) < Γ then for all σ ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ Fi (Γ), vσ(d) , f (vσ(C)).
Proof. First notice that in the definition of Fi (Γ), the restriction actually forgets the second coordinate
of the inputs and outputs. But it is the second coordinate that all σ ∈ Σ try to adjust. By definition, the
first coordinates of vσ(c) for all c ∈ Q are just themselves. So for all c ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ, h(vσ(c)) = Cl(c).
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If Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ, then (dropping the super and subscripts) d ∈ Cl(C). This means the same
as {d} ⊆ Cl(C), which, by the fact that Cl is a closure operator, implies Cl(d) ⊆ Cl(Cl(C)) =
Cl(C). Then Cl(d) ⊆ Cl(C), which means h(vσ(d)) ≤ Cl(C) in L for all σ ∈ Σ. Also, Cl(C) =∨
{Cl(c1),Cl(c2), . . .Cl(cn)} =
∨
h(vσ(C)) for all σ ∈ Σ. So indeed h(vσ(d)) ≤
∨
h(vσ(C)) in L.
Together with the functionality assumed for Σ, this means mapping vσ(C) to vσ(d) simultaneously for
all σ ∈ Σ is allowed in Fi (Γ). Then we can extend this partial map to a map from G
n to G in Fi (Γ).
An easy solution is to do projection for all other possible inputs.
If Kfi(C, d) < Γ, then d < Cl(C) and hence Cl(d) * Cl(C). If Σ is empty, the statement is trivially
true. So assume Σ is not empty. Now take an arbitrary σ ∈ Σ. Then h(vσ(d)) 6≤
∨
h(vσ(C)), which
violates the restriction on Fi (Γ) if vσ(C) is to be mapped to vσ(d). Thus, for all f ∈ Fi (Γ), vσ(d) ,
f (vσ(C)).
This proposition says that the dependency lattice LΓ
i
and the corresponding function domain Fi (Γ)
form a suitable representation of the function domain that i uses implicitly given i’s knowledge and
ignorance in Γ. As we hinted before the construction, this function domain is so specific about what is
possible that when Kfi(C, d) is not known, it is not rejected by a failure of functionality, which requires
at least two epistemically possible assignment, but by a failure of conforming to the prior knowledge
encoded in the function domain, as shown by the second bullet in the previous proposition. On the
other hand, once functionality holds in all possible assignments, we do not need to worry about whether
the function domain allows it or not, which is clear from the proof of the first bullet. Thus, this Fi (Γ)
is a perfect choice.
For the Kvi part, we need to adjust the assignments of variables to construct more (epistemically)
possible assignments to reject formulas like Kvi(d) which is not in Γ: if in one world d is assigned to
be x, then we want to make an adjustment to get a new world where it is assigned to y , x. This will
be done by moving the value of d to 〈d, 1〉 from 〈d, 0〉 or vice versa. And for agent i in a maximal
consistent set Γ, the variables to be moved are exactly Kvi,Γ = {d | Kvi(d) < Γ}, the complement
of the set of the variables with a known value by i. By maximality, it is also the collection of all
d ∈ Q such that ¬Kvi(d) ∈ Γ. It is crucial to move the value of all variables in Kvi,Γ at once, as
otherwise there might be some unwanted violation of functionality: even though for both σ = σ1, σ2,
h(vσ(d)) ≤
∨
h(vσ(C)), it could be that vσ1(C) = vσ2 (C) while vσ1 (d) , vσ1(d). So in this case,
no functional dependency exists from C to d, but the reason is not that d is at the wrong place in the
lattice, but instead the failure of functionality. We must avoid this situation, by changing all values of
variables in Kvi,Γ simultaneously when producing a new possible assignments in a new possible world.
This motivates the following definition:
Definition 7 (Value Move) Given Γ a maximal consistent set and i ∈ A, define the value move
operator MvΓ
i
: 2Q → 2Q:
MvΓi (σ)(d) =
{
σ(d) d ∈ Kvi,Γ
1 − σ(d) d ∈ Kvi,Γ .
This operator captures agent i’s switching of the values of the variables in Kvi,Γ all at once. Two
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important properties should be noted. First, MvΓ
i
is dependent only on Ki,Γ . Indeed it only depends
on Kvi,Γ but because of the axioms KV4 and KV5, it is equivalent to say that it depends only on Ki,Γ .
This means that if Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ , then as an operator, Mv
Γ
i
= MvΓ
′
i
.
Another important property of this operator is that MvΓ
i
(MvΓ
i
(σ)) = σ for all Γ, i, σ ranging over
maximal consistent sets, A and 2Q. Thus, it is actually an inverse operator.
Equipped with the above definitions, the canonical model can now be defined:
Definition 8 (Canonical Model) Build a modelM = 〈W, 〈∼i〉i∈A,U,V, 〈Fi〉i∈A〉 as follows:
• W = {〈Γ, σ〉 | Γ a maximal consistent set, σ ∈ 2Q},
• 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ
′, σ′〉 iff
1. Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ , which says that two worlds must share the same set of knowledge of i, and
2. σ = σ′ or σ = MvΓ
i
(σ′), which says that any agent i needs to see some different possible
assignments of the variables, but not too many: just two,
• U(〈Γ, σ〉, p) = [p ∈ Γ],
• V(〈Γ, σ〉, d) = 〈d, σ(d)〉, or equivalently using notations introduced above in Proposition 9,
V(〈Γ, σ〉) = vσ,
• Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) = Fi (Γ).
Before proving the truth lemma, it must be shown thatM is indeed a model of LKVF∗m. This amounts
to checking the following:
• ∼i is an equivalence relation for all i ∈ A,
• Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) satisfies the soundness condition,
• if 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ
′, σ′〉 then Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) = Fi(〈Γ
′, σ′〉).
Because ∼i is defined using equality, its reflexivity is easy to see. We need the two special properties
of MvΓ
i
noted right after the Definition 7 to show symmetry and transitivity.
For symmetry, suppose 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ
′, σ′〉. Then Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ . Thus, Mv
Γ
i
= MvΓ
′
i
and σ =
MvΓ
i
(σ′) = MvΓ
′
i
(σ′). Also, asMvΓ
′
i
is an inverse operator, by applying it twice, we get σ′ = MvΓ
′
i
(σ).
So it can be concluded that 〈Γ′, σ′〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉.
Transitivity can be shown similarly. Suppose 〈Γ1, σ1〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ2, σ2〉. It immediately
follows that Mv
Γ1
i
= MvΓ
i
= Mv
Γ2
i
. So we can treat all of them as MvΓ
i
. Then we know σ = σ1 or
σ = MvΓ
i
(σ1), and σ = σ2 or σ = Mv
Γ
i
(σ2). There are in total four possibilities depending on which
disjuncts hold, and the only less trivial one is when σ1 = Mv
Γ
i
(σ) and σ = MvΓ
i
(σ2). But if that is the
case, then σ1 = Mv
Γ
i
(MvΓ
i
(σ2)) = σ2. So transitivity holds.
The soundness condition was already shown when Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) = Fi (Γ) is defined in Proposition 8.
We also noted that Fi (Γ) only depends on Ki,Γ because it only depends on the dependency lattice L
Γ
i
,
which in turn only depends on Ki,Γ . If 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ
′, σ′〉, Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ and Fi (Γ) = Fi (Γ
′), so indeed
Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) = Fi(〈Γ
′, σ′〉). So we conclude thatM is a model of LKVF∗m.
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The unconventional second condition for ∼i is there for the purpose of preventing unwanted failure
of functionality. As explained after Proposition 9, we are not refuting Kf (C, d) using functionality,
so it is better to keep the functionalities between as many variables as possible. In particular, all
functionalities between the variables in Kvi,Γ can be preserved. The condition does this by requiring
that if i sees more than one possibility for some variables, then all the values of Kvi,Γ must change to
a different epistemic possibility together using the value move operator. This makes impossible the
situation where one variable in Kvi,Γ realizes a different possibility while another stays the same, a
situation that characterizes the failure of functionality.
Now the truth lemma in this case can be proven:
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma) For all φ in the language of LKVF∗m and all maximal consistent sets Γ
in the axiom system LKVFm,M, 〈Γ, σ〉  φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Use induction on φ. The propositional letters and boolean combination cases are conventional.
We focus on the knowledge cases.
φ = Kiψ. If Kiψ ∈ Γ, then by the definition of ∼i , for all 〈Γ
′, σ′〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉, Ki,Γ = Ki,Γ′ . Thus,
ψ ∈ Ki,Γ′ and Kiψ ∈ Γ
′. By axiom T, ψ ∈ Γ′, and using the induction hypothesis, M, 〈Γ′, σ′〉  ψ.
Thus,M, 〈Γ, σ〉  Kiψ by the semantic clause of Ki .
If Kiψ < Γ, then by a standard argument using axioms and the maximality of Γ, Ki,Γ ∪ {¬ψ} is
consistent and expandable to a maximal consistent set Γ′. Then 〈Γ′, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉 andM, 〈Γ, σ〉  ¬ψ
by the induction hypothesis. SoM, 〈Γ, σ〉 2 Kiψ.
φ = Kvi(d). If Kvi(d) ∈ Γ, then d ∈ Kvi,Γ and thus Mv
Γ
i
(σ)(d) = σ(d). Now for all 〈Γ′, σ′〉 ∼i
〈Γ, σ〉, σ is equal to σ′ or MvΓ
i
(σ′). But as d ∈ Kvi,Γ, Mv
Γ
i
is not changing the value of d. So in
either case, σ′(d) = σ(d). Thus, the value of d is fixed to 〈d, σ(d)〉 among all worlds accessible by i
from 〈Γ, σ〉.
If Kvi(d) < Γ, then d < Kvi,Γ and Mv
Γ
i
(σ) will change the value of d. Take the world 〈Γ′, σ′〉 with
σ′ = MvΓ
i
(σ). Then σ = MvΓ
i
(σ′), so 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ
′, σ′〉. Also, σ′(d) = 1 − σ(d) , σ(d). Thus,
V(〈Γ′, σ′〉, d) , V(〈Γ, σ〉, d). By the semantic clause of Kvi(d),M, 〈Γ, σ〉 2 Kvi(d).
φ = Kfi(C, d). Suppose Kfi(C, d) ∈ Γ. Then we should first show that the functionality condition
holds. For any 〈Γ1, σ1〉, 〈Γ2, σ2〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉, if V(〈Γ1, σ1〉,C) = V(〈Γ2, σ2〉,C), then there are two
possibilities
• C ⊆ Kvi,Γ. Then by axiom VF, d ∈ Kvi,Γ as well, and by the argument in the previous case,
V(〈Γ1, σ1〉, d) = V(〈Γ2, σ2〉, d) = 〈d, σ(d)〉.
• C * Kvi,Γ. Then take c ∈ C ∩ Kvi,Γ. Since V(〈Γ1, σ1〉,C) = V(〈Γ2, σ2〉,C), σ1(c) = σ2(c).
Because 〈Γ1, σ1〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉 ∼i 〈Γ2, σ2〉, 〈Γ1, σ1〉 ∼i 〈Γ2, σ2〉. So either σ1 = σ2 or σ1 =
Mv
Γ1
i
(σ2). But the latter case cannot happen because if that is true, then σ1(c) , σ2(c) since
c ∈ Kvi,Γ. So σ1 = σ2 and in particular σ1(d) = σ2(d). Thus, V(〈Γ1, σ1〉, d) = V(〈Γ2, σ2〉, d).
Indeed, by our definition of ∼i , among all worlds accessible from 〈Γ, σ〉 by ∼i , there are altogether only
two possible valuations: σ and MvΓ
i
(σ). Thus, by applying Proposition 9 to set Σ = {σ′ | 〈Γ′, σ′〉 ∼i
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〈Γ, σ〉}, it follows that there exists a function f ∈ Fi (Γ) = Fi(〈Γ, σ〉) such that V(〈Γ
′, σ′〉, d) =
f (V(〈Γ′, σ′〉,C)) for all 〈Γ′, σ′〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉. SoM, 〈Γ, σ〉  Kfi(C, d).
If Kfi(C, d) < Γ, then by Proposition 9 again, for every function f ∈ Fi (Γ) = Fi(〈Γ, σ〉), there
exists 〈Γ′, σ′〉 ∼i 〈Γ, σ〉 such that V(〈Γ
′, σ′〉, d) , f (V(〈Γ′, σ′〉,C)). Actually 〈Γ, σ〉 itself works
here. Thus,M, 〈Γ, σ〉 2 Kfi(C, d). 
From the truth lemma, it can be concluded that every consistent set is satisfied somewhere in the
canonical model M built above. So the completeness of LKVF with respect to LKVF∗m follows.
Together with the soundness proven in Proposition 8, we obtain an axiomatization of LKVF∗m:
Theorem 5 Under the cardinality requirement G ≥ |Q × {0, 1}|, LKVFm is an axiomatization of
LKVF∗m.
7 Discussion and Future Work
First, we discuss the semantics of the Kf operator. Obviously, while Kv(d) means that there is only
one value for d to take, in general, the truth of Kf (C, d) does not force the set of possible functional
dependency relations of d on C to be a singleton.
It could be argued that the agent can nevertheless regard all those candidates as equivalent, because
they must have exactly the same behavior over the partial domain P = {V(w,C) | w ∈ W}. And things
inG |C | but outside this set P are epistemically impossible. Thus, the behavior of functions onG |C |\P
is something that our agent can and will ignore if situations epistemically impossible do not concern the
agent. One example, also mentioned in the introduction, is when “knowing-value” is the real objective
of the agent and “knowing-dependency” only expresses the agent’s potential to know more values. The
semantics proposed in this paper allows adjustments to F, which might be a consequence of an agent’s
concern about situations epistemically impossible, but not necessarily. And even if it is the case, the
semantics does not show how F is derived from what concerns of the agents.
It is not uncommon that epistemic possibilities are not the right place to stop when evaluating
knowledge of functional dependency. Consider the following example:
I know the color of my hair. Therefore, I know the color of my hair functionally depends
on the number of fingers I have.
This argument is very hard to swallow intuitively. Yet it is validated by the axiom EXT. Indeed, in the
current setting of the semantics of Kf , to validate this, we only need to allow a moderate amount of
constant functions in our function domain. The root of the problem is that, in a pure epistemic logic
setting, if something is known, the agent has no access to other alternatives as knowledge is the only
modality here, whereas in most realistic situations, even when something is known, we have modal
access to some possibilities different from the known one. For example, possibilities in the future or
past can be used to explain why the color of my hair is not really dependent on the number of fingers I
have. And even when I have not and will not change the color of my hair, we can still use metaphysical
possibilities: “the color of my hair could be different, regardless of how many fingers I have.”
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Thus, it might be of interest to capture knowledge of functional dependency in another modality.
To do this we can add a new modality  interpreted by a relation R. Then “knowing a/the functional
dependency” can now be expressed by an operator Kf  with the following semantics:
〈W,∼, R,U,V〉,w  Kf (C, d) ⇔ ∃ f ∈ F,∀w′ ∼ w, ∀w∗, Rw′w∗ ⇒ V(w∗, d) = f (V(w∗,C))
where ∼ is the epistemic indistinguishability relation. This definition still says that there exists a
function that works for all epistemically indistinguishable worlds. But here “works” means f captures
the functional dependency of d upon C with respect to another modality  which might be different
from K .
The choice of R can be arbitrary, but at least two interesting candidates are immediate: an
equivalence relation to capture metaphysical possibilities and a linear or branching time relation used
in temporal logics. A simple observation is that, if we still want a new version of VF, namely
VF
′ :
∧
c∈C
Kv(c) ∧ Kf (C, d) → Kv(d)
to be valid, we need R to be reflexive. Otherwise, the functional dependency might be only talking
about worlds far away from the actual world, though accessible through R. Since the choice for R can
be flexible, there will be many interesting results to be discovered under this semantics. In particular,
for the study of completeness, we might want to add more first order features to facilitate a proof more
similar to its first order counterpart, a strategy successfully employed in [1]. It might be desirable
because, with two modalities, a direct construction of value assignments can be unmanageable.
But a demanding reader may still not be satisfied, as even if we add a new modality, the choice
of the functions could be nonunique again. This motivates another interpretation of knowledge of
functional dependency, emphasizing even more the “knowledge” part: Kf (C, d) says that the agent has
gathered so much information that there is (almost) exactly one function that can be used to explain
the data he/she has seen so far. Thus, knowledge appears only when there is only one possible or a
few very plausible explanations. If there is no possible explanation in the sense that no function in the
function domain F is applicable, or there are too many explanations, no knowledge is obtained. This
sounds natural, but much more technically will be needed to formalize this: either a counting operator,
or a probabilistic operator tracking the posterior distribution over the candidate explanations.
There are also interesting possible extensions of the framework given in this paper. For example,
the multiagent case here assumed a no-interaction semantics. But once we require prior knowledge of
possible functions to be available to other agents, interesting interactions will appear. For example,
suppose Fj is known to agent i, i.e., if w ∼i w
′ then Fj(w) = Fj(w
′). Then the following is valid:
Kvi(c) ∧ Kvi(d) ∧ Ki(Kvj(c) ∧ Kvj (d)) → KiKfj(c, d) ∨ Ki¬Kfj(c, d).
Intuitively this says that if agent i knows the values of c, d and knows that agent j knows, then either i
knows that j has an explanation of the value of c, d or i knows that j does not have one. The antecedent
fixes the value of c, d in all worlds accessible first from i and then from j. Thus if j fails or succeeds
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to explain this particular instance, agent i knows it. Stronger interactions will appear if we require all
agents to share a single prior knowledge base F, i.e., for all i,w, Fi(w) = F. Then the following is
valid:
Kvi(c) ∧ Kvi(d) ∧ Ki(Kvj(c) ∧ Kvj(d)) → (Kfi(c, d) → Kfj(c, d)).
This says that if i knows the value of c, d and knows that j knows them, then i being able to explain
this instance implies that j can explain it as well. To axiomatize these two cases, new axioms and
techniques will emerge. Further, we can also add an operator that expresses knowledge about other
agents’ function domain.
Computationally, we see without too much surprise that the finite model property holds. For all
the three single agent cases with a finite language, the required size of G and the size of the model
constructed can be explicitly computed. In the multiagent case, a standard filtration method can also be
applied quite straightforwardly. Notice that in each of the three cases, the completeness proof requires
a minimal size of G. A natural question is whether we can bring down the size requirement by giving
more economic completeness proofs. In particular, the double exponential size requirement in the
single agent fixed intermediate function domain case seems to be too large, while the number of value
assignments seems too small (just 2). We might be able to implement a trade-off here or a smarter
lattice construction.
In summary, introducing knowledge about functional dependency relations brings us ample new
opportunities to extend the border of epistemic logic. There will be a lot more to achieve.
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